Volume 13 , May 2025 , Pages 669-688
1 Jindal School of International Affairs Director | Centre for Northeast Asian Studies O.P. Jindal Global University, India
This paper aims to examine how cross-strait dynamics shape India’s policies toward the broader Northeast and Southeast Asian regions. The goal is to identify key scenarios in which India may find itself as cross-strait tensions evolve.
India has followed the "One China Policy" since December 30, 1949, when it shifted its diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) to the People's Republic of China (PRC). However, India's involvement in the region did not end there. India sought to act as a peace mediator during the missile crises of 1954-55 and 1958, though its efforts were sidelined due to broader geopolitical considerations by major powers (Gokhale, 2023, p. 19). One reason for India's attempt to mediate was the leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who led the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).
Following this period, India's engagement with Taiwan (ROC) remained minimal until both sides mutually re-established economic and cultural ties in 1995 by opening representative offices, which function as de facto embassies. Since then, relations between India and Taiwan have grown significantly in the areas of education, culture, and politics. India’s border conflict with the PRC in 1962, and subsequent incidents over the years, did not lead to a shift in its "One China Policy." Historically, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) avoided commenting on cross-strait issues. However, following the Galwan incident with the PRC in 2020, India’s stance shifted. In August 2022, the MEA expressed concerns about peace and stability in the region, urging all parties to exercise restraint and avoid unilateral actions. COVID-19 also accelerated India’s engagement with Taiwan, particularly through Taiwan’s early assistance in providing face masks and other medical supplies during the pandemic.
The research will delve into the past studies of India’s engagement in the region, but also will highlight on why Cross-strait is important to India’s larger “Act East Policy”. Any Cross-strait contingency will affect India’s trade with other East Asian countries primarily with South Korea and Japan, both of which are strategic partners. The paper argues that, India’s changing stance on Cross-strait relations is a “strategic hedging” against China. As Taiwan faces territorial claims over its territories, India faces the same from PRC on its land borders, which makes India and Taiwan as somewhat natural partners with same set of common aggression faced by them.
Key Words: India, Taiwan, China, Act East, One China