آليات اتخاذ القرارات (آليات التصويت) داخل مجلس النواب العراقي بين الأُطر الدستورية والواقع السياسي
Volume 13 , May 2025 , Pages 360-366
Authors
Ban Satar Mutab ; Taha Hamid Hassan Al-Anbaki
10.17656/jlps.10348
Keywords
Abstract
Decision-making mechanisms (voting mechanisms) embody the manner in which the relevant institution operates. They also reflect the fluidity or complexity of this process, especially with the high ceiling of the required percentage (two-thirds or three-fifths). Several variables affect this framework, including: the nature of the political system, partisan competition, the scope of influence of interest groups, and the strength of public opinion. Accordingly, the general rule for decision-making mechanisms approved by the permanent and effective Iraqi Constitution issued in 2005 for the Iraqi Council of Representatives, meaning (voting mechanisms), is based on a simple majority after achieving the legal quorum (half + 1). Contrary to this, other constitutional texts have been included that emphasize the adoption of an absolute majority, a two-thirds majority, and a three-fifths majority. Despite the general political consensus that the aforementioned mechanisms can achieve on important and fateful issues, they can disrupt many interests if that majority cannot be achieved. This matter is determined by many political factors, and this is what will be focused on in this modest research by achieving a comparison between the constitutional texts and the political reality since the entry into force of the aforementioned constitution. Therefore, this research is divided into three sections. The first section presents the structural and functional framework of the House of Representatives, i.e., we examine its composition and how it is formed, as the sole current legislative institution in the absence of the Federation Council. We then examine the institution's most important functions, and then examine its voting mechanisms—decision-making—according to the 2005 Permanent Iraqi Constitution. The second section attempts to diagnose the voting behavior of political forces during the period 2006–2018, and the resulting legislative, oversight, and other outcomes. In the third section, we present the same behavior for the period 2018–2025.
The fundamental outcome of this research is as follows: While the voting mechanisms approved by the constitutional legislator for the House of Representatives were supposed to contribute to achieving the greatest possible degree of political consensus, the difficulty of achieving this consensus has, in turn, led to a decline in the House's performance. This has been the case since 2006 until today (mid-2025). Keywords: Voting mechanisms, Iraqi Parliament, Constitutional frameworks
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- First online15 May 2025
- Published at15 May 2025
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